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them directly. In her general introduction she notes a renewed interest in Herodean 
studies (33), referring readers to Esposito’s chapter in Blackwell’s Companion to 
Hellenistic Literature (2010). Zanker’s entry in the online Oxford Bibliographies 
(2014) is also an important resource.
Rist’s translation, as I hope this review demonstrates, is much more than a 
translation. From its provocative front cover image of the Capitoline Museum stat-
ue of a drunken old woman to the contents within, it is a window into a world of 
literary antiquity that few modern readers know. My only criticism, and it is not of 
the author herself, is the book’s price: $120.00 for a one hundred and fifty-two page 
hardcover translation. This book’s potential readership is very wide, but its cost may 
be prohibitive to the general audience for whom it is intended. It is hoped that the 
publisher will be able to lower the price substantially for future editions.
NECJ 44.2   David Kutzko
    Western Michigan University
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Straumann’s superb new book cuts a bold path. Assembling a wealth of evidence 
that solidifies but never limits its argumentative reach, Crisis and Constitutionalism 
forges a synthetic portrait of Roman political thought and traces its reverberations 
across the early modern era. At its center is the idea of a constitution, or a framework 
of higher-order laws that define and legitimate ordinary legal rules. According to 
Straumann, constitutionalism was a Roman invention, something that “developed 
out the crises of the [late] Republic” (18) and unified the otherwise disparate polit-
ical arguments and initiatives of that era. Even as partisans continued to disagree 
about the legitimacy of certain legal innovations, Straumann argues, they revealed 
themselves to possess a shared sense of the kind of argument that had to be made 
for or against such measures. It was not enough to assess a law in moral or prudential 
terms, Straumann maintains: the critical test was whether or not it was constitution-
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al in the sense of being consistent with a body of entrenched political norms.
On the basis of this apparently simple claim, Straumann launches a further 
series of arguments. The first has to do with the substance of political disagreement 
in the late Republic. According to Straumann, Rome was torn apart by competing 
views about its own constitution—the “crisis” of the late Republic was in fact a 
constitutional crisis. On one side were those who traced all legal authority to the 
sovereign power of the Roman people, as shown by passages in Livy and Appian. On 
the other side were those who traced it primarily to custom (mos), although Cicero 
is shown to have taken the further step of grounding the authority of custom itself 
in natural law. 
Straumann’s fuller argument for reading Cicero’s treatment of natural law as 
a species of constitutionalism appears later in the book (Chapter 4). But even so, 
Straumann’s discussion of Roman constitutionalism early on skews heavily toward 
Cicero’s position, foreshadowing its privileged status in the narrative that follows. 
The case for understanding Roman ideas of popular sovereignty as expressions of 
constitutionalism is comparatively brief and theoretically problematic. Political the-
orists will surely be surprised to find thorny questions about the relationship be-
tween popular sovereignty and constitutionalism waved aside with the observation 
that “even an institutional setup which does not allow for any norms of a higher 
order than whatever the legislature provides for would seem to rely on at least one 
higher-order norm: the rule that ‘whatever the legislature provides for, is binding 
law’” (36). Moreover, Straumann himself reveals that at least some attributions of 
absolute legislative authority to the popular assembly explicitly traced it back to the 
ancient laws of Rome’s earliest kings (39-41), effectively subsuming it within a fur-
ther, unspecified constitutional order—possibly custom and/or natural law.
Moving forward, the book wavers somewhat uneasily between these impulses: 
on the one hand, loosening the idea of constitutionalism enough to support the 
claim that “diverging interpretations of the constitution were at the center of the 
crisis of the late Republic” (18, emphasis added), not disagreements about the very 
existence of a Roman constitution spurred by arguments on behalf of the unlimited 
power of the assembly; on the other hand, tightening the idea of constitutionalism 
enough that it can also be said to constitute a distinct intellectual tradition among 
modern writers, one that does not simply include anyone with a concept of sov-
ereignty. Notably, for example, Straumann does not rest his argument for Bodin’s 
constitutionalism on his absolutism, i.e. the observation that whatever the sovereign 
provides for is binding law, but instead his views about natural law and the limits 
they place on sovereign power. Similarly, one learns that Rousseau and the Jacobins 
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were not constitutional thinkers, despite their strong arguments on behalf of pop-
ular sovereignty, because they characterized the authority of the people as wholly 
“unconstrained” (329).
In short, it would seem that Straumann can successfully make one of the two 
big arguments that he presents in this book – but not both. A second, related issue 
has to do with Straumann’s effort to present “virtue” as a conceptual alternative 
to constitutionalism in both Roman and post-Roman theorizing about republican 
politics. According to Straumann, the so-called ‘neo-Roman’ republican tradition 
that figures so prominently in the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit is “not 
… part of the Roman constitutional tradition that is my subject in this book, but 
rather a relic of an Augustinian tradition” (260) in which Rome was celebrated pri-
marily for its virtues. As Straumann goes to explain, Augustine adapted this view of 
Rome from Sallust and passed it on to Machiavelli, who praised glory-seeking for its 
ability “to motivate citizens to preserve and expand their state” (270). Machiavelli’s 
position, so described, is contrasted with a variety of interrelated opinions attributed 
to Cicero: that virtue should be defined as living in accordance with natural justice; 
that ordering society in accordance with natural justice is necessary for its stability 
over time; and that imperial expansion is justifiable only as “the expansion of ‘natural 
constitutional law’” (276).
It is a shame that Straumann confines the real crescendo of his book—the exile 
of Machiavelli from a political tradition that he is often thought to epitomize—to 
a mere four pages. But the fundamental argument seems to be that Machiavelli is 
not a constitutional thinker because he does not subscribe to a theory of natural 
law. For Straumann, it is not enough that Machiavelli writes extensively about the 
entrenched, higher-order norms that guided Roman politics until the late Republic 
(its “ancient orders” and “ordinary modes,” e.g. 1.1-1.7, 1.9, 1.11, 1.18, 1.34-1.35, 1.40, 3.1, 
3.22, 3.25). The fact that Machiavelli denies the existence of constitutional standards 
prior to the founding of specific constitutional orders reveals him to be a leader of 
“the anti-constitutional tradition” (260) instead.
Having offered these brief critiques of Crisis and Constitutionalism, let me 
now be clear about one thing: Straumann has written a brilliant book. Narrating 
the history of political thought around a few organizing ideas is always a fraught 
enterprise, susceptible at every turn to charges of imprecision, misinterpretation, and 
over-generalization—just think of the decades of criticism that have been visited 
on J. G. A. Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment. But these are also the books that have 
done the most to shape how we think about the past and to energize our debates 
about it. In Crisis and Constitutionalism, Straumann has challenged us to think 
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much more deeply about constitutional theory and I look forward to discussing his 
arguments for years to come.
NECJ 44.2    Michelle T. Clarke 
     Dartmouth College
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Writing a good student commentary is a more daunting task than one might think. 
To begin with, it can be difficult for the expert Latinist to understand where his or 
her students might struggle in the Latin and even when they overcome this diffi-
culty they must then decide how much help is too much or too little. Some seem to 
eschew helping students at all to pursue their own philological interests, despite the 
ambit of the publisher or book series. I think in particular here of Andrew Dyck’s 
commentary on Cicero’s Catilinarian orations in the Cambridge “Green and Yel-
low” series: it has been invaluable resource to me in my own research, while proving 
to be much more technical than even the students of an advanced undergraduate 
Latin seminar can handle. Other texts have an arrangement of text and aid to the 
reader that are, to put it mildly, not user-friendly. Such texts require the instructor 
to explain how to use the book properly before proceeding, or, by separating the 
commentary from the text itself, they often discourage the student from checking 
the notes at all.
In her new student commentary covering a total of 30 letters of Pliny the 
Younger, Jo-Ann Shelton has provided a valuable vade mecum to intermediate Lat-
in students everywhere. More importantly Shelton has confronted the difficulties 
I outlined above with aplomb. It is a volume with much to offer the student and 
teacher alike with individual comments perceptively attuned to the needs of the 
fledgling Latinist, and countless opportunities for the instructor to not just run spot 
drills of syntactical and grammatical concepts, but to expand the class’s perspective 
out from pure philology to consider questions of Roman social life explored by Pliny.
Shelton begins with an excellent introduction that concisely and cogently sets 
out Pliny’s life and times and his literary output. Important terms about Roman 
